THE MARTIAL IMAGINATION

Cultural Aspects of American Warfare

Edited by Jimmy L. Bryan Jr.

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For my father, the original Jimmy L. Bryan, USN, 1960–1964

Militarizing the Menagerie

American Zoos from World War II to the Early Cold War

John M. Kinder

> A zoo is a place of escape from the troubles of the world. A man can go there and forget about the Russians, inflation, and a nagging wife.
>
> *William Mann, Director of the National Zoological Park in Washington, DC, 1948.*

> Every cultural institution is involved, in one way or another, in this world maelstrom. In these times there are no happy, isolated, enchanted isles. As an institution providing recreation and education of a virtually unique kind, as an interpreter of nature and its principles, we face ever-growing opportunities and obligations.
>
> *Fairfield Osborn Jr., President of the New York Zoological Society, 1950.*

In April 1951, Julian Frazier, the swaggering director of the Lincoln Park Zoo in Oklahoma City, revealed the existence of a secret disaster plan designed to meet the dangers of the atomic age. Interviewed by a local paper, Frazier declared that, in the event of a Soviet attack, the zoo's most "dangerous" residents—one tiger, two lions, two leopards, three panthers, and eight mangy bears—would be locked away in their cages, which were as "deep as the average air raid shelter, and under heavy concrete." As for the zoo's prized collection of chimpanzees—also considered a flight risk and, if loose, a public menace—Frazier reassured Sooner readers that, if a "stray bomber tried to put the zoo out of whack," the chimps would be "as scared as anyone else," adding that "any blast strong enough to open their steel pens would take care of them too." By Frazier's account, the zoo animals' bunker-like enclosures, routinely patrolled by gun-wielding animal keepers, were not only sufficiently hardened against aerial assault; they were, in fact, the "safest place to live" in the entire city.[1]

For all his bluster, Frazier was not the only "zooman" of his era—and they were mainly men—to feel the hot winds of nuclear destruction blowing down

his neck. From World War II to the early decades of the Cold War, zoo directors, animal keepers, exhibit designers, and wild game traders found their professional aspirations bound up with geopolitical forces that, on the surface at least, had little to do with displays of caged animals. In many respects, this nexus of beast and bomb was hardly new. From the mid-nineteenth century to the present day, the histories of zoos and modern warfare have been inextricably intertwined. During the Victorian era, when the modern zoo supplanted the private menagerie as the primary mode of live animal exhibition in industrial modernity, European and American zoos reaped the benefits of war and imperial expansion, relying heavily upon military resources to stock their collections with foreign species from around the globe.[2] Since that time, zoos have been routinely mobilized in times of international conflict, hot and cold, as centers of military recruitment, sites of war memorialization, and symbolic spaces where military campaigns are publicized and legitimated.[3]

Zoo animals have seldom fared well during wartime, of course. Shot, poisoned, massacred, and starved—often by the humans charged with their care—captive fauna rarely figured in wartime casualty lists. Much the same can be said about the zoo itself, an institution whose martial past has been largely ignored by academic and popular historians alike. This absence should come as no surprise. Part circus, part museum, part laboratory, part prison: the modern zoo defies neat categorization. Moreover, even the most inventive historians of American warfare—and of the Cold War in particular—have been slow to recognize the political significance of human-animal relations and the structures that give them meaning. While the Cold War's effects on civil defense, science education, architecture, and urban planning have been richly documented, the zoo—which draws upon all of these professional discourses among many others—remains little more than a historical footnote.[4]

Nevertheless, zoos have much to teach us about the intersection of militarism, politics, and popular culture in midcentury America, particularly in the early decades of the Cold War. At a time when zoo attendance topped that of all major sports combined, US zoos were invested with highly charged, though seemingly contradictory, political symbolism.[5] On the one hand, Cold War-era zoos functioned as important nodes in what American Studies scholar Christina Klein has called a "global imaginary of integration." One of the "two ideological foundations of postwar foreign policy," integration was premised on the belief that international "cooperation" and "mutuality" were the keys to ensuring global security in the atomic age. Advocates of integration imagined a vision of world community (under the leadership of the United States and other Western capitalist powers) in which ideological "differences could be bridged and transcended" through communication and exchange.[6] The zoo's role as a showcase of such a vision was not lost on Cold War-era zoo leaders. In their publicity materials, professional practices, and private correspondence, America's top

"zoomen" not only forged working partnerships with their Sino-Soviet counterparts, but also championed a globally integrated *zoo world* that, in one director's words, was not "bound by national ties."[7]

On the other hand, Cold War-era US zoos were affected by an equally pervasive trend in post-World War II American life: militarization. Historian Michael S. Sherry, perhaps the foremost authority on the topic, has described militarization as the "process by which war and national security became consuming anxieties and provided the memories, models, and metaphors that shaped broad areas of national life" in twentieth century America.[8] In redeploying Sherry's definition, I do not mean to suggest that American zoos adopted military tactics or were staffed by military personnel during the Cold War. Rather, my use of "militarization" refers to zoos' reliance upon military power and diplomatic back-channels to carry out their institutional missions; zoo professionals' attempts to leverage their Cold War status to boost their civic and scientific standings; and—as Julian Frazier's attack scenario reveals—the extent to which anxieties about war and national security cast a shadow over American zoo-keeping after World War II. In these ways, the zoo came to mirror the values of the second "ideological foundation" of Cold War American culture: containment, a military-political discourse premised on the suppression of Communist power and ideology around the globe.

Focusing on the three largest and most influential US zoos of the postwar era—the San Diego Zoo, the Bronx Zoo, and the National Zoological Park—I argue that American zoos were deeply influenced by Cold War politics. From their publicity materials to their built environments, zoos embodied key tenets of a two-pronged foreign policy designed to win American hegemony around the globe. In turn, I suggest that Cold War-era zoos operated as part of a military-zoological complex, a network of relationships between zoos, the US military, and the federal government that shapes American zoo-keeping to this day.

American Zoos Go to War

To understand the politics of American zoo-keeping in the Cold War, we must first look to World War II, a period when the forces of militarization radically transformed zoos around the globe. In Europe, for decades the center of the zoo world, animal collections suffered incalculable damage from air raids, looting, and wartime privation. Bombed twelve times between September 8, 1941, and February 24, 1945, the Berlin Zoo was reduced to a pile of rubble, with fewer than 100 of its specimens surviving the war intact.[9] Other foreign zoos endured similar fates. In February 1943, more than 150 large mammals were killed during a series of incendiary attacks on the world-famous Hagenbeck Zoo, near Hamburg.[10] In Japan, hundreds of zoo animals died

from malnutrition, disease, and aerial bombardment, while a select number of "dangerous animals"—including elephants, hippopotami, and large carnivores—were "prophylactically" slaughtered in the name of public safety and national sacrifice.[11]

Closer to home, American zoos spent the war years on high alert. Three days after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, W. H. Blackburne, head zookeeper at the National Zoological Park (NZP) in Washington, DC, made an inventory of zoo firearms (one Winchester .45, one .32- caliber rifle, one 12-gauge shotgun, one .22-caliber Savage, an out-of-order Colt .22, and one cane gun) in anticipation of future emergencies.[12] Shortly thereafter, NZP director William Mann distributed air raid instructions to all employees. (If enemy planes were approaching, the zoo's signal system would deliver a "steady blast of horns," warning all zoo staff to get to their posts.)[13] The story was the same at zoos across the country. In San Diego, zoo staff ran emergency bombing drills and shuttered their most vulnerable exhibits behind large plates of metal.[14] At the Bronx Zoo, the nightly security ritual included chaining the elephant herd and locking up all big cats in "steel and concrete compartments." Meanwhile, the entire zoo grounds was patrolled around the clock by maintenance workers trained in marksmanship at a local police armory.[15]

In devising their defense strategies, American zoos were less concerned with keeping their animals safe than preventing their escape—a nightmare scenario even in times of peace.[16] Fearing their homes would soon be overrun by hordes of shell-shocked carnivores, some members of the public called for the destruction of all "dangerous" zoo animals.[17] "Bombs would be bad enough, or wild animals or big snakes," one nervous DC resident complained, "but having them together sure gives you the creeps."[18] On February 26, William Mann went on the local "Capital Motoring" radio show to reassure District listeners that the zoo was safe. Working from a script, Mann explained to co-hosts Ted Kellog and Larry Larrazole: "a bomb big enough to break the walls of a Zoo building would more than likely kill the animals inside. But just in case—we have our guns well oiled."[19] However, most American zoos decided against preemptively slaughtering their animal stock. Some zoo officials believed that the beefed-up security precautions were adequate to the task. Others, including Capt. Jean Delacour, a French zoo authority on loan to the Bronx Zoo during the war years, suggested that nature itself was the most formidable obstacle to escape. As he explained to the *New York Times* in December 1941, New York City's cold winter climate would kill off any poisonous snakes—often the locus of public fears about animal escape—that managed to elude capture.[20]

Yet, even at the war's darkest hour, many Americans continued to champion the zoo's civic mission. Once viewed as little more than glorified menageries, wartime zoos were celebrated as bastions of normalcy, built reminders

Many of the most prominent zoos of Europe and Asia were destroyed during World War II. In Berlin, thousands of animals were killed, and much of the zoo's famed architecture—including the camel house (seen here in 1946)—was severely damaged during Allied bomb attacks on the German capital. Image courtesy of Zoolischer Garten Berlin.

of pre-war innocence. In a letter to Fairfield Osborn Jr., president of the New York Zoological Society, one zoo fan declared:

> In the most troublesome times, people have always turned to the zoos in ever increasing numbers for relaxation, amusement and scientific knowledge. . . . As a matter of fact, I feel, it is as much of a patriotic contribution to the winning of this war and to the post war future to keep the zoos going, for their value to the public morale if not else, as it is to keep the wheels of industry rolling.[21]

Many zoo professionals agreed and, ever fearful of declining ticket sales, went to great lengths to defend the zoo's contributions to home front life. Writing in *Zoonooz,* the official magazine of the San Diego Zoo, in 1942, director Belle Benchley pronounced the zoo the "most wholesome form of constructive entertainment to be found in the city"—a sentiment echoed by zoos, large and small, across the United States. In Benchley's mind, zoos performed a sedative function, easing the "tense and jittery nerves" of their patrons. At a time when movies and radio were dedicated to the "tragedies of war," she argued, a trip to the zoo gave visitors a chance to "get close to nature" and restore a "calm and sane perspective."[22]

In addition to boosting public morale, American zoos took part in a wide range of military activities. At the Bronx Zoo and Aquarium, zoo staff tested shark repellents and underwater "electrical detection devices"; studied the viability of "parasitized fish" as emergency food rations; and, in a hidden laboratory in the Lion House basement, conducted top-secret chemical warfare experiments with electric eels. The zoo's publishing office distributed books on natural history to US troops stationed in the Pacific, and its "Lost in the Jungle" exhibit—designed by the zoo's world-renowned Department of Tropical Research—taught more than 500,000 visitors how to survive in jungle terrain. According to zoo officials, the exhibit was a special favorite with servicemen, who would spend hours copying down its instructions.[23] Other zoos followed suit, hosting war bond rallies, donating animal specimens—alive and dead—for military research, and bending their institutional agendas to the needs of the wartime state.

American zoos' war work was significant for several reasons. First, it demonstrated zoos' willingness to "do their bit" in times of national crisis. Chronically underfunded and lacking key personnel (the exodus of male zoo staff to the military and war industries was so overwhelming that many zoos hired their first female animal-keepers during World War II), American zoos were eager to prove that they were a vital national resource, if only as a temporary distraction from war's horrors. Cooperating with military and defense officials also allowed zoo professionals to stake their claim within the burgeoning military-zoological complex, a claim that would be cemented even further in the early decades of the Cold War when the militarization of nonhuman animal life—from bomb-detecting dolphins to chimpanzee astronauts—led to heightened interest in zoological matters among military and defense planners. In turn, zoos' contributions to the war effort reflected a broader transformation in the priorities and politics of American science. Gone were the days when zoos—or any scientific institution for that matter—could expect to pursue matters of "pure" research. Rather, as Fairfield Osborn Jr. explained in 1943, "War of the kind we are now waging raises problems that would hardly be conceived in peace time and the answers must be sought in fields that normally have little to do with the cataclysm of war. . . . By some twist of war's necessities, some of the most theoretical considerations were adaptable to pressing practical endeavors."[24]

Unfortunately, such sentiments proved little comfort to zoo professionals outside the United States. By 1945, years of violence and privation had left the global zoo industry in shambles—international trade routes disrupted, animal stock demolished, human expertise diminished for a generation. Initially, European zoo directors looked to their nations' colonial possessions in Africa and Asia to restock their devastated collections. Anticipating a large shipment of elephants and primates from the "French Cameroons," Paris Zoo director

Achille Urbain told *Life Magazine* in 1948: "In one stroke, we shall restore the glories of this zoo."[25] Much to the dismay of First World zoo professionals, however, the rising tide of anticolonial movements across the Global South—coupled with the relative decline of the European powers following World War II—threatened to dissolve the centuries-old networks of imperial exploitation and exchange which had provided the invisible backbone of the modern zoo until that point.[26] Though European (and American) zoos would continue to mount animal expeditions throughout the postwar years, they could depend less and less upon colonial handlers to snare the most prized animal specimens.

Consequently, war-damaged zoos began to turn to the United States to repopulate their animal collections. American zoos were primed to assume hegemonic status in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Throughout the war, civilian and naval vessels had sent a steady stream of exotic creatures—many plucked straight from Pacific theater battlefields—to hometown zoos in the United States. More important still, American zoos had survived the war architecturally intact, having suffered none of the aerial bombardment that had devastated so many of their European and Asian competitors. Yet another factor working in US zoos' favor was their relative isolation from international networks of animal exchange. Even before war was declared, a number of major American zoos had begun to cultivate extensive captive breeding programs, allowing them to maintain vast collections, despite wartime travel restrictions. Describing a rash of births at Chicago's Brookfield Zoo in September 1944, *Life Magazine* pronounced,

> Brookfield's multifarious births exemplify the solution US zoos have found for their problem of wartime maintenance. Since exotic importations from Asia, Africa and even South America have been curtailed by lack of safaris and shipping space, zoomen have been encouraging intramural procreation. Single males and females are shipped from zoo to zoo for breeding purposes, or swapped outright as needs arise.[27]

Thanks to technology and careful planning, American zoos had no need for international travel; they could reproduce zoo-worthy megafauna from the safety of US soil.

In fact, zoo spokesmen were optimistic that the professional and technical innovations of the war years had laid the groundwork for a revolution in American zoo-keeping for decades to come. In August 1945, *The Billboard,* a popular magazine covering the entertainment industry, offered a typically upbeat assessment of the war's legacy on American zoos. Detailing ongoing plans to renovate the Brookfield Zoo, the magazine explained: "Plastics, glass and other materials developed during the last few years are being tested for use in post-war construction." In the zoo of the future, "Apes, now confined

to behind bars, will be housed in a building made of plastic such as is used in plane turrets."[28] For many industry insiders, World War II was less a tragedy than an opportunity for American zoos to jumpstart their plans for modernization.[29] Long in the shadow of their European competitors, it seemed the American Century of zoo-keeping was finally at hand.[30]

It was against this backdrop that American zoos took up one of their most important and influential missions of the immediate postwar period: restocking the depleted zoos of Europe and Asia. In an analogue to the Marshall Plan, US zoos routinely sent shipments of animals and supplies to former allies and enemies alike, a gesture that went a long way towards confirming US global leadership in zoo circles after World War II.[31] Much of this activity—which the *New York Times* described as a "lend-lease plan"—was centered on large metropolitan zoos, whose directors and staff were more likely to have maintained international contacts from before the war.[32] In July 1946, the San Diego Zoo—using Europe's animal crisis to score publicity points at home—urged Southern California residents to capture local snakes and bring them to the reptile house, so that London Zoo's collection could be replenished.[33] A few years later the New York Zoological Society initiated its Point IV Program, dedicated to aiding zoologists and scientific laboratories across Western Europe.[34] Smaller zoos also got in the act, with Salt Lake City's Hogle Zoo sending shipments of turtles, lions, pumas, skunks, macaws, and coyotes to war-torn Japan throughout the late 1940s.[35]

Such displays of generosity were motivated by more than altruism. American zoos frequently expected and received native species in return for the ones they sent abroad. By helping their foreign competitors, zoos in the United States also hoped to secure a dominant position within a rapidly changing zoo world. However, perhaps the biggest motivating factor behind Americans' efforts to restock the war-damaged zoos of Europe and Asia was a growing climate of postwar international integration. Even as the United States sought to "contain" Soviet expansion, it forged alliances with nations across the globe, drawing them together within a growing sphere of American influence and power. US zoos were keen to use their resources to help reconstruct an international zoo community shattered by more than five years of deadly conflict. At the same time, zoo professionals in the United States cooperated with the federal government to position the zoo as an important site of cultural diplomacy, a place where past and present enmities could be set aside in the spirit of science and mutual collaboration.

Rebuilding the Bars of Friendship

Given zoos' absence in most Cold War accounts, it is somewhat ironic that—for a brief moment at least—the zoo occupied center-stage in the drama of

postwar US foreign relations. In 1972, then President Richard Nixon returned from "Red China" with a pair of giant pandas, the first of their species to be exhibited in the United States for more than two decades. Arriving in wooden crates labeled in both Chinese and English:

> GIANT PANDAS
> Presented from the Peking Revolutionary Committee,
> The People's Republic of China

Ling-Ling and Hsing-Hsing came to symbolize a new era of openness between the Cold War rivals. Over the following years, panda-mania swept the nation, and millions of Americans flocked to Washington, DC, to catch a glimpse of the furry visitors.[36]

Yet zoo animals' role in mediating US foreign relations did not begin in 1972. Since the late nineteenth century, foreign leaders had made a habit of sending native species to sitting US presidents (or the "children of America") as tokens of international friendship, leading one commentator to note: "In some respects the political history of the United States can be traced by the successive donations to the Washington Zoo."[37] US politicians responded in kind, and by the end of World War II, the gifting of zoo animals had become an increasingly popular tactic for expressing American goodwill overseas. With the coming of the Cold War, zoological diplomacy expanded even further, as both the federal government and US industry sought new techniques for winning hearts and minds around the globe. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, American zoos reached across the Iron and Bamboo Curtains to exchange animals and information with their Communist counterparts.[38]

Meanwhile, zoos became regular stops for foreign dignitaries visiting the United States and for American ambassadors stationed abroad. (In his 1959 victory tour of New York City, a young Fidel Castro dropped by the Bronx Zoo, calling it the "best thing" in the city.)[39] From this perspective, Nixon's triumph in China appears less a singular achievement than the culmination of nearly a century of diplomatic tradition. Decades before Ling-Ling and Hsing-Hsing's arrival, zoo animals were already among the most visible and beloved goodwill ambassadors of the atomic age.

In the United States, the preeminent staging ground for Cold War-era zoological diplomacy was the National Zoological Park in Washington DC. Located fewer than three miles from the White House, the NZP bore witness to a wide range of diplomatic activities—from routine visits by foreign diplomats to high-profile animal presentation ceremonies designed to win the affection of the American public. In the 1950s, animal presentation ceremonies were exceedingly theatrical affairs, orchestrated to allow all parties—the donor nation, US federal officials, and members of the zoo community—to

testify to the occasions' political significance. As William Mann, director of the National Zoo from 1925 to 1956, recalled, no detail was left to chance:

> Generally, the ambassador or other foreign representative makes the presentation. Then a lad from our State Department in morning coat and striped pants makes a speech of acceptance. After this it is protocol for me to add a few words assuring everyone that the gift will be well fed and well cared for. I always wear my official zoo clothes. Shirt sleeves in summer, suit jacket in winter. With matching pants.[40]

In April 1950, the National Zoo hosted one of the most publicized animal presentations of the early Cold War, when more than 80,000 people flocked to the National Zoo to watch Indian Ambassador Madame Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit donate a pair of elephants, Ashoka and Shanti, on behalf of the newly formed Indian government.[41] Like the People-to-People program (1956-present) to which Cold War-era animal donations and exchanges were often compared, such gestures "helped construct the global imaginary of integration by insisting that vast differences among peoples could be bridged with relative ease."[42] Specifically, they were premised on the sentimental belief that, whatever two countries' political divisions might be, they could always find common ground on certain matters, including children's seemingly universal love of elephants.

As perhaps the most outwardly "international" of all American cultural institutions, the zoo seemed the perfect setting for articulating a vision of US-led global integration. In their staged simulacra of foreign locales, zoos offered American visitors a chance to imagine themselves as world travelers and to seek connections between disparate peoples, places, and wildlife. More important still, zoo advocates believed that the zoo's built environment fostered an atmosphere of conviviality and goodwill—ideal for inspiring the affective bonds upon which a global imaginary of integration depended. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, zoo publications cast the zoo as a distinctly un-ideological space, an urban Eden where visitors' political allegiances faded against the backdrop of nature's (caged) splendor. In June 1958, Osborn offered a typical account of the zoo's power to bridge national divides in the pages of *Animal Kingdom,* the house organ of the New York Zoological Society. Describing a recent visit of more than seventy representatives from the nearby United Nations, Osborn told readers:

> There was magic in the day which cast its spell over everyone. For once, one felt that the problems of mankind had flown away into the bright May air. It seemed that conflicts between countries must indeed be imaginary, for on this day there was complete mutuality in the enjoyment of observing animals and contemplating the wonders of nature. For a while at least it was impossible that there could be friction between man and man.[43]



The exchange of animals and zoological expertise was an important venue of cultural diplomacy throughout the Cold War. Well before the "panda diplomacy" of the 1970s, both the US government and individual zoos often donated animals to foreign zoos as tokens of international goodwill. Here, coyotes and other "typical" American animals from zoos in Boston and Washington, DC, are en route to the Delhi Zoological Park in February 1962. US Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith and his family inspect the living cargo. Courtesy of Smithsonian Institution Image Archives, Image #2013-03565.

Displaying its pastoral landscapes, exotic motifs, and lush floral plantings, the Cold War-era zoo was thought to offer an escape from the ideological divisiveness and existential emptiness of the atomic age. It was, as one industry insider later summarized, "a healing island of naturalness and reality in a megalopitan sea of artificiality, an island that can give people glimpses of beauty and mystery, and unexpected familiarity."[44]

Despite the zoo's aura of "mutuality," conducting zoological diplomacy was no easy affair. As Belle Benchley told *Zoonooz* readers in 1950, "any sort of a deal in zoological specimens comprises not only the usual dickering, bargaining, tax costs, and shipping arrangements, but it also involves many laws regarding permits to capture, permits to export and permits to import;

health certificates, shipping instructions, feeding en route, consular invoices, inspection, insurance and quarantine regulations."[45] Americans hoping to use animals to win international goodwill faced additional challenges. The semiotics of animal exchange was difficult to parse, and there was always the danger of gifting animals that conveyed the wrong political message. In the run-up to Nixon's visit to China, for example, the State Department nixed the idea of sending a bald eagle because it feared the bird would be seen as overly aggressive. (After rejecting a number of "inappropriate" animals, US officials eventually settled upon a pair of musk-oxen).[46] What's more, unlike American jazz musicians and works of abstract art—both of which toured the globe as American cultural ambassadors during the Cold War—zoo animals had the all-too-frequent habit of dying before they could serve their diplomatic purpose.[47] In October 1962, NZP director Theodore Reed raised this point to an official at the United States Information Agency (USIA), at the time eager to support the newly opened zoo in Baghdad. Fearful that America's latest corps of animal diplomats might expire in Iraq's summertime heat, Reed warned: "I am sure you are aware of the fact that a shipment of dead animals arriving can be a great blow to national prestige, and of course where there are live animals there is always the possibility of a mishap, resulting in a tragic situation, both from the animals' standpoint and perhaps the USIA."[48]

While most American zoos were happy to assist the US diplomatic mission, the zoo industry and federal government did not always see eye-to-eye. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, zoos' insatiable desire for exotic creatures occasionally clashed with official foreign policy, which severely restricted trade with large chunks of the Communist world. In 1958, the State Department prevented Chicago's Brookfield Zoo from purchasing a panda from an African animal dealer because the Chinese species was considered "enemy goods." (Chi-Chi was later sold to the London Zoo for $28,000.)[49] Even with diplomatic approval, American zoos sometimes resorted to cloak-and-dagger tactics to carry out their institutional missions. In scenarios ripped from the pages of a John le Carré thriller, zoo leaders often relied upon intermediaries—usually animal dealers based in Africa and Western Europe—to swap species with their Cold War rivals. Meetings typically took place in "neutral" locations, including Rotterdam, home of the International Union of Directors of Zoological Gardens (IUDZG), a global organization of zoo professionals formed in 1946.[50]

Ultimately, American zoos displayed the greatest commitment to a politics of international integration in their professional dealings with foreign zoos. Even as Joseph McCarthy thundered against the "Red Menace" infecting American society, zoo leaders like William Mann and Theodore Reed maintained an open dialogue with their Communist (and noncommunist)

counterparts, exchanging information, participating in captive breeding programs, and sponsoring international conferences on a wide range of subjects. In the 1950s and 1960s, American zoos hosted scores of animal keepers, scientists, and zoology students from overseas. (Among them was Dr. Abelarde Moreno, who, in 1959, visited the National Zoo seeking assistance for the recently "liberated" Cuban Zoological Gardens.)[51]

Meanwhile, American zoo leaders conducted their own brand of integration diplomacy, touring foreign zoological parks and forging close personal ties with fellow zoo professionals from as far away as Moscow and East Berlin. To be sure, US zoos had much to gain from such relationships. Working with overseas partners, including some in China, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe, American zoos not only acquired new opportunities for animal exchange, but also boosted their international prestige in the previously European-dominated zoo world. Still, it would be a mistake to think that American zoos were driven solely by economic or professional self-interest. American "zoomen" considered themselves part of a small, close-knit fraternity, one that, in their minds, transcended national and ideological divisions. Moreover, by the mid-twentieth century, zoo leaders around the world understood that their industry's future depended upon cooperation and mutual aid. Faced with the terrors of nuclear destruction, environmental collapse, and species extinction, not even American zoos could afford to go it alone.

Cold Warriors in Khaki

Despite their gestures of friendship, not all zoo leaders were eager to join forces with their Communist counterparts—particularly when the Cold War threatened to turn hot. In the late 1940s and 1950s, the United States adopted a foreign policy of Soviet containment designed, in diplomat George F. Kennan's words, to serve as a "counter-force" against "Russian expansive tendencies."[52] The flip side of international integration, containment was premised, according to cultural historian Alan Nadel, on the notion that "the world was divided into two monolithic camps, one dedicated to promoting the inextricable combination of capitalism, democracy, and (Judeo-Christian) religion, and one seeking to destroy that ideological amalgamation by any means." Overseas, containment policy involved the mobilization of a vast array of state and public resources—military, economic, and cultural—to validate US claims of global authority and to halt the spread of Soviet power. At home, much of "containment culture" was aimed at a different, albeit complementary, set of goals: discrediting political and sexual "subversives," promoting conformity as a social ideal, and celebrating the institutions—including the US military—that made containment possible.[53] In sum, containment demanded not just political consensus but the militarization of most facets of American life.

Few cultural institutions better embodied the values of Cold War containment than zoos. With their iron cages, concrete moats, and *cordons sanitaires*, many American zoos already resembled miniature prisons, their built environments hardened against attacks from without and subversion from within. More often than any other Cold War recreational space, the zoo also shared containment's paranoid worldview, its insistence on the need for constant security, surveillance, and, in times of crisis, the use of violent force.

There were other parallels as well. In their publicity materials, zoos drew upon the same imagery of nuclear family togetherness that provided the ideological glue of domestic containment. More significant still, by the early 1950s the modern zoo and containment were increasingly justified in reference to a similar apocalyptic imaginary, a vision of political and natural history at an end.[54] Indeed, the threat of impending global destruction—either from nuclear war or, more likely, hyper-industrialization—imbued Cold War zookeeping with a heightened sense of urgency and mission, one that exceeded its purpose even during World War II. Like the continuity of government bunkers that undergirded the Cold War landscape, the zoo was meant to serve as a metaphorical ark, preserving "order" in the face of imminent extinction.

Not surprisingly, in periods of international turmoil, American zoo leaders were quick to adopt an antagonistic stance toward America's Cold War adversaries. In December 1951, with US troops locked in a bloody stalemate in Korea, Osborn used his monthly *Animal Kingdom* editorial to deliver a blistering critique of Communist expansion:

> The Soviets have constructed a one-way street carrying a constant and immense traffic of ideological power, of threats, and of fear. Its cargoes are unloaded the world over, irresistibly influencing the economy and cultures of every country.
>
> It is hard to realize that these influences, spewing out from the one-way street the Soviets have built, strike directly at the continuing welfare of our cultural institutions. This, no doubt, is as the Soviets would wish it and it is well to recognize the ugly fact.

A longtime advocate of international cooperation, Osborn blamed Soviet aggression for stalling the Bronx Zoo's latest building projects, including a long-delayed aquarium. Nevertheless, he promised that American zoos would continue to play their part in the "struggle" to contain Communism both at home and abroad:

> Let us ourselves be prepared to meet this continuing challenge. Our Society is part of the American scene, making its own special contributions to recreation, to education and to scientific knowledge. No, we must not be checked,

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the San Diego Zoo's friendly relationship with the US military was an important part of its public image. The zoo's publicity materials, including the zoo's popular magazine *Zoonooz*, routinely highlighted the zoo's contributions to the martial state, both material and symbolic. Among the San Diego Zoo's most celebrated "enlistees" was Duke, a four-month-old lion cub, which the park donated to the navy minesweeper USS *Embattle* in 1960. Image reproduced with permission from the San Diego Zoo.

> nor stopped, nor lose our sense of permanency and growth. As never before, it is the time when all who believe these things can render support.[55]

Other zoo leaders felt the same and were eager to do their part to meet the needs of Cold War containment. Drawing upon their experiences in World War II, zoos built bomb and fallout shelters (frequently beneath the concrete floors of pachyderm houses), trained staff in civil defense activities, and developed disaster scenarios in case of Soviet attack. Along with military mascots, they housed animal veterans of the Korean War, the Space Race, and the atomic bomb experiments at Bikini atoll, a symbolic gesture that validated the future militarization of other nonhuman animals. Most important, American zoos developed close working relationships with a legion of government scientists, military officials, and defense planners, all of whom were keen to mobilize the zoo—and the expertise of those who worked there—to thwart Communism's growth around the globe. When the East Berlin Zoo announced its intention to become the largest zoological park in the world in 1954, for example, the State Department urged "American zoological societies to contribute money to the reconstruction" of the West Berlin Zoo, so that this capitalist ally of the United States would not lose its "lead."[56] As State Department officials saw it, the United States was engaged in a global propaganda war and the zoo could play an important role in showcasing Western zoological supremacy.

Nowhere was the militarization of American zoo-keeping more visible than in San Diego, the city Roger W. Lotchin has deemed the "quintessential martial metropolis" of Cold War America. A boomtown during World War II, San Diego expanded rapidly throughout the postwar years, in no small part because of military development. By the 1950s, the navy in particular was "inextricably bound up with [both] the city's everyday work life" and its "recreational and historical consciousness."[57] Its influence was especially pronounced at the San Diego Zoo, which had emerged from World War II as one of the top zoological parks in the world. Born out of abandoned animal exhibits at the 1915 Panama-California Exposition, the San Diego Zoo had enjoyed a cozy relationship with the navy from the start. As the zoo's founder, Harry Wegeforth, recalled in *It Began With a Roar* (1953),

> In World War I, the infant Zoo had been strengthened by contributions of bears and seals from navy vessels—and by jungle animals brought up from Central America by marines. Species began to drift in during World War II from all over the world, wherever the American GI found himself, and remembered the Zoo of his home town. From Asiatic and South Pacific jungles, and even from Africa, service men captured and shipped to the San Diego Zoo their contributions. Adm. W. F. Halsey informally expedited such shipments of naval personnel on several occasions, mindful of the tremendous role of the San Diego Zoo in the amusement and instruction of hundred of thousands of military personnel training in, and in transit through San Diego.[58]

At war's end, the San Diego Zoo continued to maintain close ties to the city's military, diplomatic, and civil defense establishment, as it would throughout the early decades of the Cold War. In fact, so prevalent was the navy's presence at the zoo in the 1950s and 1960s, visitors could have easily mistaken the zoo grounds for a *de facto* recruiting post. As the zoo's own publicity materials make clear, references to the generosity and valor of the nation's naval forces were ever-present. The US Navy and Marines funded exhibits (including the $8000 Ape Island), sponsored children's events, staged patriotic rallies, and donated animals from overseas, all the while drawing a visible connection between the zoo's and the navy's institutional missions.[59] In return, zoo staff worked closely with federal and military scientists eager to use their professional know-how—in such varied fields as veterinary medicine, immunology, and animal psychology—to serve the needs of the Cold War state. Zoo staff also used the zoo's facilities to champion their naval benefactors and the global military mission of the United States. One especially telling opportunity came in December 1965, when Charles Schroeder, the San Diego Zoo's director throughout much of the Cold War era, received a letter from the commander of a US naval unit stationed in Vietnam. The officer asked if the zoo would accept the unit's mascot, a Vietnamese honey bear named Boo Boo, for permanent display. A vocal navy supporter, Schroeder not only agreed, but his response—"The San Diego Zoo is US Navy!"—spoke volumes about the zoo's militarized public image.[60]

So why did San Diego and other Cold War era zoos embrace an ethos of militarization? The simplest answer is that the military-zoological complex proved beneficial for all concerned (except, of course, the animals). In the zoo, the military and federal government gained not only a useful propaganda venue, but an army of veterinarians and animal scientists willing to lend their expertise—and, if needed, their animal test subjects—to the Cold War struggle. For their part, American zoos received funding, prestige, and, above all, access to an increasingly powerful military-government bureaucracy. Zoo officials used their contacts in the State Department, the US Information Agency, and the US military to secure rare animals and to raise their institutional status worldwide.[61] Further, some zoo leaders believed that by taking a side in the Cold War, they would boost their professional standing—both within the zoo industry and, more importantly, within the increasingly crowded field of "experts" that came to dominate early Cold War culture.[62] Ultimately, zoos' combined activities during World War II and the early Cold War helped prove the case—at least, in zoo professionals' own minds—that

zoos were serious cultural and scientific institutions, playing their part to assuage the anxieties of modern American life.

American Zoos and Cold War Culture

For scholars of American warfare, the history of American zoos from World War II to the early Cold War offers some important lessons. First, it reminds us that no institution, least of all one as globally connected as the modern zoo, could escape America's military encounters unscathed. Although zoos often cast themselves as sanctuaries from the "troubles of the world," wartime and Cold War geopolitical rivalries had a profound impact on American zoos—from the ways they obtained their animals to the ways they conceived their institutional missions. In addition, this history demonstrates, against popular stereotype, that American Cold War culture was far from monolithic. Both behind the scenes and, frequently, in public, American zoos functioned as models of international integration, dedicated to fostering a professional and political community that transcended national borders. At the same time, many zoos embraced a culture of militarization and containment, echoing the pervasive belief that all institutions should do their part to halt Soviet influence at home and overseas. That a single institution could so easily shuttle back and forth between the two positions—even inhabit them simultaneously—speaks to the contradictions inherent in the zoo itself, a living museum where the expansiveness and diversity of nature is invoked through man-made exhibits of concrete and iron. But it also reflects the broader schizophrenia of American culture and foreign policy during the early Cold War—a time when the United States promoted itself as both a global super-power, willing to rain down world-ending nuclear weapons upon its enemies, and a political-economic ideal seeking to liberate the globe from tyranny, poverty, and fear.

By the 1970s, many of the outward vestiges of Cold War militarization (bomb shelters, military memorials, references to nuclear attack scenarios, etc.) began to disappear from American zoos. Although certain zoos—such as the San Diego Zoo and the National Zoological Park—continued to exalt their close connections with the US military, they made little attempt to frame their mission in explicitly nationalistic, let alone militaristic, terms. In retrospect, it is impossible to pinpoint a single cause for the shift, subtle as it may have been. Nixon's trip to China, the State Department's gradual loosening of travel and trade restrictions, and the general waning of Cold War paranoia all played a part. Another important factor was American zoos' growing recognition of the threat posed by global environmental destruction, an enemy that trumped all national concerns. Nevertheless, the roots of the military-zoological complex—that intimate and mutually beneficial relationship between zoos, the armed forces, and the federal government—have not withered entirely. Even today, the US military continues to use zoos to showcase nonhuman mascots and animal veterans of armed conflicts. Indeed, given the US military's and American zoos' recent cooperation in restoring the war-damaged zoos in Kabul and Baghdad, it appears the American zoo industry has entered a new phase of militarization, putting a family-friendly face on the aftermath of American warfare across the Muslim world.[63]

Notes

Epigraph quotations at the beginning of this chapter are by William Mann, quoted in Charles J. V. Murphy, "European Zoos," *Life* (December 6, 1948): 143; and by Fairfield Osborn Jr., New York Zoological Society, *55th Annual Report for the Year 1950* (New York, 1951), 5.

1. "Zoo's Animals Won't Run Wild in Air Attack," *The Oklahoman,* April 8, 1951. Clipping found in the Oklahoma City Zoo Library, Oklahoma City, OK.

2. On the rise of the modern zoo, see David Hancocks, *A Different Nature: The Paradoxical World of Zoos and Their Uncertain Future* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Nigel Rothfels, *Savages and Beasts: The Birth of the Modern Zoo* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).

3. On the intertwined histories of war-making and zoo-keeping in the modern era, see John M. Kinder, "Zoo Animals and Modern War: Captive Casualties, Patriotic Citizens, and Good Soldiers," in *Animals and War: Studies of Europe and North America,* ed. Ryan Hediger (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 45–75.

4. Notable exceptions include Randy Malamud, *Reading Zoos: Representations of Animals and Captivity* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 199–207; Vernon N. Kisling Jr., ed., *Zoo and Aquarium History: Ancient Animal Collections to Zoological Gardens* (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2001); Charles Homans, "Zoopolitics: How Caged Animals Became a Tool of Statecraft," *Foreign Policy,* May 26, 2010 (www.foreignpolicy.com).

5. "Symposium: What's new at the zoo?" *The Rotarian,* 130 (January 1977): 16–18.

6. Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945–1961* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 23, 24, 41. According to Klein, "A global imaginary is an ideological creation that maps the world conceptually and defines the primary relations among peoples, nations, and regions. As an imaginative, discursive construct, it . . . creates a common sense about how the world functions as a system and offers implicit instruction in how to maneuver within that system." Challenging monolithic interpretations of Cold War America, Klein contends that two mutually constitutive "global imaginaries" shaped postwar policy and culture: integration and containment (23).

7. Charles R. Schroeder quoted in "Symposium: What's new at the zoo?" 50.

8. Michael S. Sherry, *In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), xi.

9. Harro Strehlow, "Zoological Gardens of Western Europe," in Kisling, ed., *Zoo and Aquarium,* 107.

10. "Famous Hamburg Zoo Lost Heavily in Raids; Main Problem Now Is Restocking and Food," *New York Times,* June 17, 1946 (hereafter *NYT*).

11. Frederick S. Litten, "Starving the Elephants: The Slaughter of Animals in Wartime Tokyo's Ueno Zoo," *The Asia-Pacific Journal,* vol. 38-3-09 (September 21, 2009); Ken Kawata, "Zoological Gardens of Japan," in Kisling, ed., *Zoo and Aquarium,* 299–300.

12. H. W. Blackburne, "List of Guns on hand," December 10, 1941, Folder 2, Box 191, Record Unit 74, Smithsonian Institution Archives, Washington, DC (hereafter SIA).

13. W. M. Mann, "Air Raid Instructions to Employees," March 8, 1943, Folder 2, Box 191, Record Unit 74, SIA.

14. Harry Milton Wegeforth and Neil Morgan, *It Began with a Roar: The Story of San Diego's World-Famous Zoo* (San Diego: Pioneer Printers, 1953), 161.

15. "Bronx Zoo Ready for Air Raid in City," *NYT,* December 18, 1941.

16. See, for example, Belle Benchley, "The Zoo and Its Defense Activities," *Zoonooz,* (February 1942): 7. Floyd S. Young, director of Chicago's Lincoln Park Zoo, conceded that "Baboons and other fierce muscular primates would better be shot dead than risk their getting loose in a war stricken city." Quoted in Mark Rosenthal, Carol Tauber, and Edward Uhler, *The Ark in the Park: The Story of the Lincoln Park Zoo* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003), 73.

17. The London Zoo had implemented just such a policy, killing all of its poisonous snakes, insects, and spiders less than forty-eight hours after Hitler's armies invaded Poland. "London Kills Zoo Snakes Lest Air Raid Free Them," *NYT*, September 3, 1939.

18. Mary A. Bessemer to Dr. [William] Mann, c. January 1942, Folder 2, Box 191, Record Unit 74, SIA.

19. "Capitol Motoring No. 64," February 26, 1942, (script copy), in Folder 1, Box 213, Record Unit 74, SIA.

20. "Bronx Zoo Ready," *NYT*, December 18, 1941.

21. Don Lang to Fairfield Osborn, April 4, 1942, Folder 3:3, Box 4, Record Group 2, New York Zoological Society Library, Bronx Zoo.

22. Benchley, "The Zoo and Its Defense Activities," 7. See also Belle Benchley, "We Give You Nature," *Parks and Recreation,* (November–December 1942): 87–88.

23. New York Zoological Society, *48th Annual Report for the Year 1943* (New York: 1944), 3, 5, 19; New York Zoological Society, *49th Annual Report for the Year 1944* (New York: 1945), 23; William Bridges, "The Electric Eel Went to War," *Animal Kingdom,* (March–April 1946): 73–5, 88.

24. Quoted in New York Zoological Society, *47th Annual Report for the Year 1942* (New York: 1943), 18. On this shift in American science (and social science), see Stuart W. Leslie, *The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 1–13; and Terence Ball, "The Politics of Social Science in Postwar America," in *Recasting America: Culture and Politics in the Age of Cold War,* ed. Lary May (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 76–92.

25. Quoted in Murphy, "European Zoos," 146.

26. On the impact of anticolonial movements on Western zoos, see Homans, "Zoopolitics"; and Bill Parry, "Zoo Animal Prices Rise in S. Africa," *San Diego Union,* May 14, 1963.

27. "Fecundity in the Chicago Zoo," *Life,* (October 9, 1944): 41. Writing nearly two years later, Robert MacMillan echoed *Life's* sentiments, arguing that "The reason there are plenty of animals for the public to marvel or shudder at is because of friendly horse-trading among the big zoos, and because of Love, which in its natural course brings baby hippos, giraffes, lions, bears and suchlike to the zoos without anybody having to chase them down in the jungle" (60). See Robert MacMillan, "War Left Zoos in Pretty Fair Shape—Spectators Happy," *Chicago Daily News,* March 10, 1946.

28. "Chi's Brookfield Zoo Plans Post-War Transformation," *The Billboard,* (August 18, 1945): 49. As Stanley Field, the Chairman of the Chicago Zoological Society Building Committee, later reported, PLEXI-GLASS promised to revolutionize animal exhibits in the postwar era. Not only was the material virtually unbreakable, it was also airtight, which helped protect the "valuable animals" from the "respiratory diseases" of zoo visitors. Chicago Zoological Society, *Report of the Chairman of the Building Committee,* (Chicago: January 15, 1946), 4.

29. E.g., "A Modernized Zoo Pledged by Osborn," *NYT*, January 13, 1943.

30. In a typical account of the United States' new status in the "brave new postwar world" of zoos, one writer gushed, "United States zoos . . . are now the world's best, say judicious zoo men. Before the war they conceded that our zoos as a whole were surpassed by the great collections in London, Antwerp, Rotterdam, Berlin and elsewhere. While the war forced those zoos to retrench, ours forged ahead." "US Zoos Best in World; Packed with New Animals," (November 20, 1947), clipping in Folder 1948, Box 155, Brookfield Zoo Archives, Chicago (hereafter BZA).

31. Wegeforth and Morgan, *It Began with a Roar,* 179; "Exchange of Zoo Animals Resumed by Philly, London," *The Billboard,* (October 13, 1945): 58.

32. "Bronx and London Zoos Start 'Lend-Lease' Plan," *NYT*, October 11, 1947.

33. "Wanted," *Zoonooz,* (July 1946): 5.

34. New York Zoological Society, *58th Annual Report for the Year 1953* (New York: 1954), 4.

35. Ken Kawata, "Zoological Gardens of Japan," in Kisling, ed., *Zoo and Aquarium,* 300.

36. On the "panda diplomacy" of the Nixon era, see Margaret MacMillan, *Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2007).

37. Anne Gordon Suydam, "Leave to Print," (clipping), Folder 3, Box 13, Record Unit 365, SIA.

38. For evidence, see Lynn A. Griner, "Impressions of European Zoological Gardens," *Zoonooz,* (January 1967): 8–14.

39. William Bridges, *A Gathering of Animals: An Unconventional History of the New York Zoological Society* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 487.

40. Emile C. Schurmacher, "Who's Who Zoo," *The Sunday Star—This Week Magazine,* (November 14, 1954): 15.

41. Ibid., 15.

42. Klein, *Cold War Orientalism,* 52.

43. Fairfield Osborn Jr., "The World at the Zoo," *Animal Kingdom,* (June 1958): n.p.

44. William G. Conway, quoted in "Symposium: What's new at the zoo?" *The Rotarian,* 18.

45. Belle Benchley, "From the Front Office," *Zoonooz,* (December 1950): 4.

46. Theodore Reed to Leslie Sagle, November 26, 1992, Folder 8, Box 24, Record Unit 365, SIA.

47. See Frances Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York: New Press, 1999); Penny M. Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).

48. Theodore Reed to G. C. Misemer, October 31, 1962, Folder "Foreign Zoos (Miscellaneous)," Box 2, Accession 96–139, SIA.

49. "World's Rarest Baby," *Life,* (May 8, 1964): 61. Excoriating the "wooden rigidity of the State Department" on this matter, an editorial in the *Des Moines Register* openly mocked the politicization of Chinese pandas, arguing that: "Pandas are inherently un-Communist. Pandas had nothing to do with aggression in Korea or anywhere else. . . . Pandas never brainwashed American prisoners of war, or charged America with germ warfare. . . . Pandas are in the interest of national defense, domestic tranquility, international harmony." "Saving Us from Communism," *Des Moines Register,* (n.d.), clipping in Folder: Panda, Box 156, BZA.

50. "Zoo Here May Get Animals from Reds," *Milwaukee Journal,* November 9, 1958 (clipping), Folder 12, Box 11, Zoological Society of Milwaukee County Records, Special Collections Library, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.

51. Abelarde Moreno to Theodore Read [*sic*], November 15, 1959, Folder "Havana (Cuba) Zoo," Box 2, Accession 96–139, SIA.

52. Quoted in Klein, *Cold War Orientalism,* 24.

53. Alan Nadel, *Containment Culture: American Narratives, Postmodernism, and the Atomic Age* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), 3, 4–5.

54. On the connection between fears of nuclear destruction and postwar ecological awareness, see Mark V. Barrow Jr., *Nature's Ghosts: Confronting Extinction from the Age of Jefferson to the Age of Ecology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 306–310.

55. Osborn, "The Shadow of the Curtain," *Animal Kingdom,* (November–December 1951): 161.

56. N. Spencer Barnes, Chief Eastern Affairs Division, Foreign Service Dispatch, September 22, 1954, Folder "Berlin Zoo (East Germany)," Box 2, Accession 96–139, SIA.

57. Roger W. Lotchin, *Fortress California, 1910–1961: From Warfare to Welfare* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 297, 301.

58. Wegeforth and Morgan, *It Began with a Roar,* 167.

59. Among the many publicity articles dedicated to highlighting the zoo's relationship with the military, see "The Marines Have Landed," *Zoonooz,* (October 1957): n.p.; "Operation Deepfreeze Commander Thaws at Zoo," *Zoonooz,* (May 1958): n.p.; Benchley, "A Tribute to Admiral William Halsey," *Zoonooz,* (October 1959): 14.

60. Douglas G. Myers, with Lynda Rutledge Stephenson, *Mister Zoo: The Life and Legacy of Dr. Charles Schroeder, The World-Famous San Diego Zoo and Wild Animal Park's Legendary Director* (San Diego: The Zoological Society of San Diego, 1999), 96, 97.

61. For evidence of the San Diego Zoo's diplomatic activities, see Zoological Society of San Diego Oral History, San Diego State University.

62. On the "cult of the expert" in postwar America, see Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era,* (Rev. Ed., New York: Basic Books, 1999), 21–22.

63. On the US military's role in rebuilding the Baghdad Zoo, see "Baghdad Zoo Answer to Monkey Surplus," *Tulsa World,* April 26, 2009.